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BSTRACT
 
Democratic deliberation is credited with a variety of virtues, including its possi-
ble usefulness in resolving, or at least ameliorating, inter-cultural conflicts. This paper ques-
tions this claim. First, it overlooks that the facts and principles involved in these conflicts
generally prove contestable and that such contestation is likely to be greater the less homoge-
nous societies are. Second, it neglects that many, if not most, citizens have neither the time
nor the inclination to acquire the conceptual and factual knowledge needed to try and over-
come these differences. As a result, the more inclusive and popular deliberation becomes, the
less suitable it may be for overcoming cross cultural disagreements. Indeed, it has the poten-
tial to exacerbate rather than narrow the differences between majorities and minorities.
These conclusions are drawn from an empirical review of a Canadian debate about aborigi-
nal rights that followed a controversial Supreme Court of Canada decision and comparing
the character of deliberation in three contexts: the legal community, the print media and
legislative bodies.
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Since at least 1990 democratic theory has taken ‘a strong deliberative turn’ (Dryzek
2001: 1). Proponents credit deliberation with many moral and epistemological
virtues: legitimization of the ultimate choice; promoting consensus; improving
participants’ intellectual and moral qualities; ‘superior’ (however defined) deci-
sions, innate desirability; and so on. Central to arguments supporting deliberation is
the claim of ‘cognitive virtue;’ it facilitates good decisions by increasing public
knowledge (Pellizzoni 2001: 67). To obtain this cognitive benefit, and to ensure that
any decision is perceived as legitimate, debate must be inclusive, open to all and all
points of view. This position is often identified with Jurgen Habermas, who argues
for the benefits of debate at all levels of society but stresses the importance of civil
society debate (Habermas 1996). Others, skeptical of the benefits of such wide-
ranging debates, argue that more limited debates amongst those knowledgeable
about the issues and vested with political or legal responsibility may be more useful.
John Rawls is the most prominent theorist who stresses the view that deliberation
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constrained by norms of public reason is normatively necessary only in strictly
political institutions, such as the courts and legislatures (Rawls 1993; 1999).
Deliberation is often said to be particularly useful for addressing the claims of
cultural minorities because it emphasizes reasons rather than numbers and is less
culturally biased than other decision tools, stressing procedural norms of dialogue
rather than culturally specific norms of justice (Bohman 1996; Young 2000; Vala-
dez 2001; Benhabib 2002). Cillion McBride also argues that deliberation ‘is sensi-
tive to [minorities’] claims of justice’ because it emphasizes ‘a conception of
impartial public reason to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate interests’
(McBride 2003: 114). Other theorists, however, argue that deliberation, particularly
intercultural deliberation, leads to polarization rather than consensus (Shapiro 1999;
Sunstein 2002).
In this paper, I focus on a particular case arising in the context of the debate in
Canada about the rights and status of Canada’s indigenous peoples (or ‘First
Nations’). I hope to accomplish two things: first I want to determine if deliberation
did or did not contribute to overcoming intercultural tensions; and second I try to
shed light on the relevance of the debate’s forum in determining whether it does
or not. I begin by briefly explaining the broad context of Canadian-indigenous
relations, focusing on the different types of disagreement at play. Subsequently,
I discuss the issue of debate forums. This is followed by an examination of the
public debate sparked by a Canadian legal case – 
 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
–
 
 with the aim of elucidating public deliberation’s usefulness in resolving intercul-
tural differences. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for my findings
for inter-cultural democratic deliberation.
 
First Nations, the Canadian State and the Tasks of Deliberation
 
According to Alan Cairns, ‘the central question in aboriginal/non-aboriginal rela-
tions in Canada … has always been, is the goal a single society with one basic model
of belonging, or is the goal a kind of parallelism–a side by side coexistence or some
intermediate position’ (Cairns 2000: 47). The first view – the goal is a single form of
citizenship – no longer has much academic support but resonates with the public.
Two general arguments underpin this position: empirically, special status results in
social isolation and relative economic deprivation for aboriginals compared to other
Canadians; normatively, it conflicts with the liberal ideal of equal citizenship. The
second view – parallel development through aboriginal self-government, the recog-
nition and enforcement of treaties, and so on, within the structure of the Canadian
state – argues that the relationship of individual aboriginals with the Canadian state
is inherently different to that of other Canadian citizens. Various normative argu-
ments support this view. Patrick Macklem categorizes these as follows: prior occu-
pancy, prior sovereignty, treaties, self-determination and preservation of minority
culture (Macklem 1995). He concludes that a right to self-government – special
status in my terminology – is best supported by all five justifications taken together
(Macklem 1995: 219). Prior occupancy, prior sovereignty and treaties are arguments
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based on historical events. Most contemporary liberal theorists argue from within a
present-oriented justice paradigm, such as that of John Rawls or Jurgen Habermas.
Historical justifications fit more readily into Robert Nozick’s framework of natural
rights, whereby ‘the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the prin-
ciples of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of
injustice’ (Nozick 1974: 153). Macklem, for his part, argues that the two perspec-
tives can be reconciled by converting both the prior occupancy and the original
sovereignty arguments into contemporary equality claims (Macklem 2001: 78–85).
In a mirror image of the economic argument used by the opposing view, it is also
often argued that restoration of a land base to First Nations will rectify the poverty
faced by many aboriginals.
Thus, the two positions are both supported by a mixture of normative principle
and factual assertion. For example, prior occupancy, which as we shall see the
Supreme Court stresses, depends, first, on the moral claim that it gives rise to a claim
to land, self-government and so on, which trumps (some) other considerations, and,
second, on a factual claim that a specific group did in fact possess a particular piece
of land. In order to debate intelligently the application of the normative principle of
prior occupancy to a given situation, factual claims must be adjudicated and norma-
tive arguments evaluated. These issues are not beyond the comprehension of the
average citizen, if he or she has the time and inclination to study them, but they may
create difficulties for any attempt to resolve differences by debate.
Luigi Pellizzoni argues that, when there are differences of opinion as to both fact
and value, three types of controversy can be distinguished. First, there may be
conflicting descriptions of the facts but shared principles; second, the description of
the facts may be similar but based on different principles; and finally, there may be
different principles and different descriptions of the facts (Pellizzoni 2001: 70). The
first two possibilities – contested facts with shared principles or shared facts but
contested principles – admit at least the possibility of an agreement. However, when
both facts and principles are contested agreement will be hard to find: 
If there is agreement on the facts, a shared solution may be found even if any
underlying conflict on principles remains unresolved; but conflict over the facts
creates far greater obstacles against finding a solution viewed by everyone as
fair. The parties insist on the relevance of different conceptual frames. They
may be using the same terms but they speak different languages. (Pellizzoni
2001: 70).
There is empirical evidence that prospects for agreement are even worse than
Pellizzoni postulates; differences on values alone (principles) may also be intracta-
ble. Citing ‘persuasive argument theory’, Tali Mendelberg writes: 
On matters of value, opportunities for deliberation are likely to turn anti-
deliberative. And even if they manage to turn argument-centered, they are
unlikely to change minds. (Mendelberg 2002: 160–161)
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The issue of special status for aboriginals is one in which both facts and principles
are disputed. In these circumstances, does public deliberation help or hinder the
search for intercultural accord? Does it matter if the debate is inclusive and uncon-
strained, as advocated by Habermas, or restricted to certain public settings, as Rawls
argues? The following section discusses the arguments around this latter question.
 
Deliberate Where?
 
For the majority of Canadians, aboriginal issues are of marginal interest most of the
time. Before they can be debated they have to come to the attention of political insti-
tutions and the general public. Habermas holds that deliberation draws much of its
moral and epistemological force from citizen debate outside the political and judi-
cial structures of the state. He does not denigrate the value of deliberation within
state structures, but adopts a ‘two track’ view of democratic legitimacy. One track
focuses on formal political and legal institutions; the second track stresses the infor-
mal public sphere (Habermas 1996: 486–487). It is Habermas’s view that many of
the major issues of recent political debate – the environment, genetic engineering,
feminism, immigration, etc. – have come to the public agenda through an energized
civil society. Indeed, he argues that it is often the confrontational tactics of civil
society actors that brings such issues to wide public attention, thus forcing political
and institutional actors to take note (Habermas 1996: 374). Ultimately however,
decisions are taken by legislative bodies, which are, or should be, themselves delib-
erative bodies. Courts, and particularly constitutional courts, while not necessarily
deliberative bodies in Habermas’s sense, play the essential role of ensuring ‘that the
process of lawmaking takes place under the legitimating conditions of deliberative
politics’ (Habermas 1996: 274). Habermas, however, is discussing debate in what is,
implicitly at least, a culturally homogeneous civil society.
Rawls’s model of deliberation differs somewhat from that of Habermas. Rawls
focuses much of his discussion of the requirements of public reason on what he
calls ‘the public political form’ which is, in essence, judges, chief executives and
legislators and candidates for public office (Rawls 1999: 575). The Supreme Court
(of the United States) is seen as the ‘exemplar of public reason’ (Rawls 1993: 231).
Debate in these institutions is not, of course, inclusive in the sense of including all
citizens. It is rather amongst and between professionals (politicians, judges,
lawyers, etc.) who, in theory at least, are knowledgeable about the issue at hand.
However, in other institutions of society, Rawls, like Habermas, upholds the idea of
unrestricted debate, writing that ‘the idea of public reason does not apply to the
background culture with its many forms of public reason nor to media of any kind’
(Rawls 1999: 576).
Canada’s First Nations, however, are not actors in Habermas’s culturally homo-
geneous society but distinct political and cultural societies. They are organized as
separate legal entities, with a variety of constitutional provisions, laws and judicial
decisions defining their evolving relationship with the Canadian state. It is possible
to argue that the existence of separate legally recognized publics is not a barrier to,
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but necessary for, inter-cultural dialogue. Separate publics permit ‘a fairer, more
equal, and more reciprocal debate’ (James 1999: 81–82). However, their existence
raises the question of how dialogue between the separate and culturally different
public spheres can, in the absence of a mutually shared ‘lifeworld’ or sense of the
common good, take the form of deliberation as envisaged by deliberative theorists
and not degenerate into simple strategic bargaining (James 2003: 164).
Nancy Fraser addresses this point, arguing that Habermas’s early account of the
public sphere stressed its singularity, ‘its claim to be 
 
the
 
 public arena’, and that
this ‘confinement of public life to a single overarching public sphere’ was, for Haber-
mas, ‘a positive and desirable state of affairs’ (Fraser 1992: 122). She goes on to
argue, correctly in my view, that separate ‘subaltern counter publics’ are necessary
to compensate for societal inequalities. Without separate public spheres, disadvan-
taged minorities ‘would have no arenas among themselves for deliberation about their
needs, objectives, and strategies’ (Fraser 1992: 123). But multiple publics must have
a shared forum in which to debate. Geoff Ely suggests that we theorize this necessary
forum of interaction ‘as the structured setting where cultural and ideological contest
or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place’, and not, as in Habermas’s
original formulation, ‘as the spontaneous and class-specific achievement of the bour-
geoisie in some sufficient sense’ (Ely 1992: 306). A comparison of Rawls’s model
with that of Habermas, as modified by Fraser and Ely, of how public deliberation
should work is the focus of my investigation. The following section describes the
origins of the case, the courts’ decisions and the debate that followed. In different
ways, both models prove more problematic than their proponents had imagined.
 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
 
Delgamuukw
 
 involves the claim of an aboriginal group in the province of British
Columbia to ownership and governance over its traditional territory. In most of
Canada, the government signed treaties with the aboriginal inhabitants, by which
aboriginals sold much of their original territory while reserving certain specified
lands for their exclusive use. In British Columbia, however, such treaties were never
signed; the provincial government simply started expropriating aboriginal lands
without consent. Therefore, there is no legal document by which aboriginal peoples
relinquished title over their traditional territories. This circumstance has created a
situation where there are vastly different perceptions about legal title to the land.
The provincial government has historically assumed that its title is valid while
aboriginal communities have tried for decades to assert their title to the land. One of
the most active communities is the ‘Gitksan’ Indian people, and it is their claim that
was the subject of the important case decided in 1997 by the Canadian Supreme
Court. I will first describe the basic details of the legal case, and then examine the
civil society debate it generated.
The 1997 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
 
Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia
 
 ended a legal process begun in 1984. The appellants, Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, had filed suit in the British Columbia Supreme Court
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seeking recognition of title to their traditional territories: ‘full ownership, self-
government, and other aboriginal rights, over 22,000 square miles of west central
British Columbia’ (Elliot 1998: 98). Their claim was largely rejected at trial and in
the British Columbia Court of Appeal. They appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which overturned the original decision and ordered a new trial. The court
did not recognize any new title to the land, or create any new institutions of self-
government; but it did insist that the lower courts had not properly interpreted the
facts and the law. In particular, it argued that the trial judge had erred in largely ignor-
ing oral histories and other oral evidence given at trial 
 
(Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1067).
The court also emphasized that aboriginal title has a special status, deserving of
distinctive protection. Aboriginal title to land is not, the court wrote, identical to
normal legal title to land; it is 
 
sui generis
 
 and ‘arises from the prior occupation of
Canada by aboriginal peoples’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1082). It is ‘a collective right
to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation’ which ‘cannot be transferred,
sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1083,
1081). If a claim to aboriginal title were successfully made for a given tract of land,
it would provide substantial control over it (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1087). A First
Nation claiming aboriginal title must meet the following criteria: 
(i) the land must have been occupied prior to [British] sovereignty. (ii) if
present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation presovereignty, there
must be a continuity between present and presovereignty occupation, and (iii)
at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive. (
 
Delgamuukw
 
(S.C.): 1097).
While aboriginal title has a special status and importance, it is not absolute. In the
event a claim to aboriginal title were proved, it would still be subject to infringe-
ment by both provincial and federal governments in pursuit of a ‘compelling and
substantial’ legislative objective, which may include such things as conservation,
economic development and the settlement of foreign populations (
 
Delgamuukw
 
(S.C.): 1107–1111). Such infringement would be subject to various judicial tests:
the scope of the infringement; consultation with the aboriginals holding the title; and
the payment of compensation (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.):1109). The court also deferred
resolving the claim to self-government because ‘errors of fact made by the trial
judge’ made it impossible ‘to determine whether the claim to self-government has
been made out’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1114).
 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
 
 attracted some public commentary as it worked
its way through the courts; the Supreme Court decision moved it to the center of
national debate. On the one hand, one might think that the decision was ideally
suited for a respectful debate. First, the court’s commentary on aboriginal title relied
for its justification on ‘prior occupancy’. While this is by no means uncontroversial
in academic circles – it conflicts with present-oriented conceptions of justice – it
does enjoy wide support. It is a well-developed theoretical perspective that lends
itself to moral and political debate. Second, the court’s decision had no immediate
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practical impact; the underlying substantive issue, whether or not the appellants
actually 
 
had
 
 aboriginal title, was referred back to the lower courts for retrial (or for
negotiation between the parties). To the best of my knowledge, the issue is still
outstanding today. Consequently, nobody’s property rights or other economic inter-
ests were immediately at risk. If public deliberation is a useful way of promoting
intercultural understanding and resolving conflicts, as its proponents argue, this case
should have been an ideal exemplar.
On the other hand, the 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 decision and its history contained precisely
that mixture of disputed facts and principles which deliberation’s critics argue can
lead to increased conflict: Should prior occupancy convey special status? Are there
meaningful ways of comparing the degree of ‘civilization’ of different societies?
Would it matter, morally, if there were? Was aboriginal title ever extinguished? Had
the aboriginals actually occupied the land continuously and exclusively? Is oral
history reliable? It is this mixture of fact and value that, in my view, makes an inves-
tigation of the debate relevant for assessing the claims of deliberation theorists.
Furthermore the discussion took place in the different forums of society – the courts
(more generally, the legal community), the media and the legislatures, making it
possible to evaluate the differences.
 
The Legal Debate
 
From the start of the litigation process, the parties differed over matters of both fact
and value. The original trial highlighted two opposing views of the First Nations,
their history and culture, their rights, and their place in contemporary Canada. The
aboriginals viewed themselves as the current representatives of an organized histor-
ical culture with its own laws and customs, equal in value to any other (Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs 1989: 21). The opposing view – aboriginal societ-
ies occupied a low level on the ladder of human development – has been described
as the ‘traditional white view’ in British Columbia (Tennant 1992: 77). This was
certainly the position the British Columbia Crown took at trial. The trial judge
summarized its position as follows: 
The defendants [the British Columbia Crown] … point to the absence of any
written history, wheeled vehicles, or beasts of burden, and suggest the Gitksan
and Wet’suwet’en civilizations, if they qualify for that description, fall within
a much lower, even primitive order. (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (trial): 31)
The trial judge himself, while he acknowledged the aboriginals’ view of themselves,
took the traditional white view put forward by the British Columbia Crown: 
The plaintiffs’ ancestors had no written language, no horses or wheeled vehi-
cles, slavery and starvation was common, and there is no doubt, to quote
Hobbes, that aboriginal life in the territory was, at best ‘nasty, brutish and
short’. (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (trial):13)
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Implicit in these putatively factual statements are views about the normative impor-
tance of different past levels of technical and social development for the rightness of
claims made today. Needless to say, the plaintiffs took a different view. They
claimed to have had and still to have their own system of law that ‘shares common
features with the legal systems of all civilized societies’ (Gitksan and Wet-suwet’en
Hereditary Chiefs 1989: 35). The trial judge concluded that he was ‘not persuaded’
as a matter of historical fact that ‘their [the plaintiffs’] ancestors practiced universal
or even uniform customs’, let alone laws (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (trial): 213). The judge was
equally dismissive of much of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, especially
the oral evidence. The plaintiffs argued that, if the court denied the validity of oral
evidence not confirmed by other scientific means, this would be ‘to disregard the
distinctive Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en system of validating historical facts’ and that
this, in turn, would undermine ‘the very possibility of dialogue’ (Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs 1989: 39–40). The oral evidence was admitted at
trial, but the judge concluded ‘that much of the plaintiffs’ historical evidence is not
literally true’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (trial): 49). As to the substantive claims to ownership
and self-government rights, the trial court’s decision was almost a total defeat for
the plaintiffs (Elliot 1998: 98).
The plaintiffs fared little better as appellants in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. The majority accepted, with certain minor differences, the trial court’s
reasoning, which was largely the view of the British Columbia Crown. The appel-
lants were held to ‘have no property rights to the lands in question and no jurisdic-
tion to enact laws that would conflict with provincial laws that apply in and to the
areas claimed’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (appeal): 3). There was, however, a dissenting opinion: 
The appeal should be allowed and a declaration made that the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en peoples have … as common law rights an aboriginal title to
occupy, possess, use and enjoy all or some of the land within the claimed terri-
tory. (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (appeal): 6, 7)
Thus, with the exception of the Appeal Court dissent, the case arrived at the
Supreme Court as a victory for the Crown and the traditional view of aboriginals and
their place in Canadian society. As I discussed above, however, the Supreme Court
majority view presented a very different view of the relevant issues. The appellants
–i.e. the original aboriginal plaintiffs – restated the views they had put forward at
trial. They used the dissenting Appeal Court opinion to support their position
(Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs 1997; Gitksan Hereditary Chiefs 1997) The
respondents – the Attorney General of Canada and Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of the Province of British Columbia – did the same (Province of British Columbia
1997; Canada, the Attorney General of 1997). The majority decision of the Supreme
Court summarizes, fairly in my view, the positions of the parties to the case as well
as the decisions of the two lower courts (including the dissenting opinion in the
British Columbia Court of Appeal). The court does, on occasion, directly address the
trial judge’s reasoning, particularly that dealing with the appropriate weight to give
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to oral history (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1071–1080). It also directly addressed the posi-
tions of the parties on the content of aboriginal title, arguing that the correct position
‘in fact, lies somewhere in between these positions’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
 (S.C.): 1080).
Nevertheless, the bulk of the court’s reasoning relies more on the court’s own previ-
ous decisions and academic legal articles than on the arguments of the lower courts,
the parties or the interveners. The result is more of a debate within a particular
segment of the legal community than an engagement with the arguments of the
parties or the lower courts. It should be noted that the courts’ discussions, while
intelligent and knowledgeable about the issues, did not arrive at or even approach a
consensus. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial judge and two of the three
Appellate Court judges; its own decision was not unanimous. The ultimate decision
was, however, more favorable to the First Nations’ positions (although exactly how
favorable is open to discussion) than either of the two lower court decisions.
After the court’s decision, the debate in the (academic) legal community was
wide-ranging and vigorous. Some thought that the decision, while not perfect, repre-
sented a substantial advance for aboriginal rights. Kent McNeil, for example, argued
that the decision provided ‘more scope for the use of oral histories’; it also ‘defined
Aboriginal title, explained what is necessary to prove it, clarified the extent of
federal authority over it, and addressed the issues of constitutional protection and
infringement’ (McNeil 2001: 323).
 
2
 
 While the court’s view of aboriginal title was
subject to certain strictures, the decision ‘nonetheless came down on the side of the
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en on the vital issue of natural resources’ (McNeil 2001:
327). However, McNeil does ask ‘why the onus is on aboriginal peoples to prove
their title’ and not on the Crown ‘when we all know that they were here occupying
lands when the newcomers arrived’ (McNeil 2001: 328). He also questions the
scope the decision leaves for governments to infringe aboriginal title for a variety of
purposes (McNeil 2001: 329). Several other commentators also wrote articles that,
while different in detail, generally felt the decision was an advance for aboriginal
rights (Wilkins 2000; Joffee 2000).
A significant number of legal academics expressed negative views, almost
uniformly on the grounds that it did not go far enough. For example, Gordon
Christie writes: 
the complete picture of aboriginal title offered in 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 … rests on
underpinnings which make the entire picture conceptually unstable and gener-
ally unacceptable … (both on moral and doctrinal grounds). (Christie 2000–
2001: 115)
William F. Flanagan argues that ‘contrary to some media reports’, the decision ‘may
not be an unqualified success for aboriginal claimants’ in that it seems especially
tailored to avoid the full legal consequences of normal property law (Flanagan 1998:
285).
 
3
 
 And John Borrows argues that ‘the Court’s decision in 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 is
infused with the Court’s acceptance of a subsequent claimant’s nonconsensual
assertion of rights over a prior owner’s land’ and that the court’s ultimate support
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of the colonization, subjection, and domination of aboriginal peoples in British
Columbia, despite its attempt to provide protections for aboriginal peoples in this
process, is not a ‘morally and politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights’
(Borrows 2001: 594, 615–661).
 
4
 
What conclusions can we draw from this debate about the theory and practice of
democratic deliberation? First, the articles cited (and others not cited) attempt to
engage the decision’s reasoning. The decision was long and complex, it drew on a
previous court decisions, and it made, as I noted above, extensive reference to the
legal literature. Therefore, to address the court’s rationale required a degree of legal
sophistication. There was no agreement, even amongst experts, as to the legal
wisdom, moral rectitude or implications for aboriginal rights of the decision.
Second, no article that I encountered in the legal literature expressed opposition to
the decision as too favorable to the aboriginal point of view.
 
5
 
 It seems reasonable to
conclude that the academic legal community was already, before this particular
issue arose, largely of one mind about both the normative weight of prior occupancy
(and the other principles supporting special status) and the facts as presented by the
original plaintiffs. In other words, the legal debate did not lead to a greater degree of
agreement; the agreement as to the general rightness of the aboriginals’ claims pre-
existed the debate. As we shall see, this outlook is sharply at odds with the general
public’s reaction to the decision and many of the reactions expressed in the legisla-
tive branches of the federal and provincial governments. Given that the Supreme
Court itself places a great deal of importance on debate within the academic
community in reaching its decision, one can only conclude that the court is, to some
extent at least, debating with a very narrow public.
 
The Media Debate
 
I reviewed the coverage given the decision by all major Canadian daily newspa-
pers. I reviewed all articles containing the word ‘Delgamuukw’ and read all except
those which were only factual recaps of the decision and in which the reference to
 
Delgamuukw
 
 was clearly tangential to their subject. Those cited are, I hope, repre-
sentative of the ideas presented that have relevance for deliberative democracy.
The Supreme Court’s decision was handed down on Thursday, 11 December
1997. Early coverage recognized the decision’s importance and tentatively raised
some of the issues which would come to dominate the public discussion: economic
uncertainty, the court’s views on oral history, the power of the Supreme Court, and
so on. For example, in a reasonably neutral editorial on 13 December 1997, the
major national English language daily newspaper, the 
 
Globe and Mail
 
, saw the deci-
sion as a step forward in resolving the open issues between First Nations and the
Canadian state (
 
Globe and Mail
 
 1997: D6). The 
 
Financial Post
 
, a business-oriented
newspaper, again in a reasonably neutral way, also stressed the need for future nego-
tiations, in order to avoid economic uncertainty (
 
Financial Post
 
 1997: 26).
Negative reaction appeared quickly. Gordon Gibson, a Vancouver-based columnist
writing in the 
 
Globe and Mail
 
, declared the decision ‘the most important political
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event in the second half of this century’, claiming that it undermined ‘all Crown title
in the province, thereby threatening natural resource revenues and freezing invest-
ment’ (Gibson 1997: A21). A letter to the editor from Martyn Brown, identified as
the executive director, The Citizens’ Voice on Native Claims, Vancouver, supported
Gibson’s position claiming that ‘the province’s unfettered title to virtually all Crown
land is now in question’, and ‘even private property may be subject to claims for
compensation of infringements against aboriginal title’. The decision was also
characterized as anti-egalitarian because ‘instead of leading to greater equality of all
Canadians, it will reinforce special status for aboriginal Canadians forever’ which,
according to the writer, is ‘exactly the opposite of what most Canadians hope to
achieve through treaty negotiations’ (Brown 1997: D7).
 
6
 
Other commentators raised the role of the judiciary. Jeffery Simpson, for
example, wrote that the decision ‘represents judicial activism on a massive scale’
(Simpson. 1998: A18). A letter to the 
 
Globe and Mail
 
 stated: ‘We must not permit
the Supreme Court to put back the clock without so much as a glance at the
Canadian population’ (Joslin 1998: A-18). Preston Manning, then leader of the
Reform Party, the Official Opposition in Parliament, advocated the creation of a
parliamentary ‘judicial reform committee’ to ‘review decisions of the Supreme
Court’ and advise Parliament of possible remedial measures, such as the use of the
notwithstanding clause of the Constitution (Manning 1998: A21).
The issue of the weight and value of oral history attracted considerable negative
commentary. In the 
 
New Brunswick Telegraph Journal
 
, David Cunningham wrote
that ‘according to some legal experts, the ruling’s most radical component is its
requirement that the courts give equal consideration to aboriginal oral evidence’
(Cunningham 1998). A subsequent article in the same paper, written by John
Robson, identified as the deputy editorial pages editor of the 
 
Ottawa Citizen
 
, went
even further. The Supreme Court, said the writer, ‘ruled that aboriginal traditional
oral knowledge had the same standing as European legal prejudices in favor of
actual evidence’. He compared this to the type of evidence produced against the
defendants at the notorious Stalinist purge trials, writing: 
So more Indians can claim land if they produce some snaggle-toothed old hag
to sing an off-key song asserting that their people used to live there. And if
someone says she just made that song up that morning she’ll sing another one
saying that it comes from the ancestors. (Robson 1998)
A more general issue raised by 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 was equality – the claim that special
treatment of aboriginals violates the basic equality of all citizens. An editorial in the
 
Ottawa Citizen
 
 argued that ‘the most troubling aspect, not only of self-government,
but of aboriginal policy generally’ is the creation of different and inherently unequal
categories of citizens: ‘Most Canadians believe – deeply – that race should have no
bearing at law, that we are all equal before the law regardless of our skin color or
ancestry’. While aboriginals are, like all Canadians, protected by antidiscrimination
laws, we are ‘left with a strange form of equality’ in that ‘laws that discriminate
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against aboriginals are offensive to equality and therefore unsustainable’ while laws
discriminating ‘in favor of aboriginals … are warmly approved and have prolifer-
ated’ (
 
Ottawa Citizen
 
 1998: B5).
The greatest concern of the decision’s opponents was, however, its potential
economic consequences. A 
 
Globe and Mail
 
 front-page article by John Gray entitled
‘Who Owns This Land? Aboriginal Rights Cast Pall over B.C. Economy’ stated that
immediately after the court’s view of aboriginal title was published ‘native people
claimed their title’. He quoted Jerry Lambert, head of the BC Business Council, as
saying ‘that for the first time, the question of land claims has surfaced as a concern
of the Canadian investment community’. The ‘uncertainty around land claims’ was
having ‘a deterrent effect on potential investors’ (Gray 1998:A1, A10). A writer in
 
The Province
 
 made a similar point, arguing that the decision ‘is raising uncertainty
and fears that are costing B.C. big money’ (Fournier 1998: A44).
There were fewer arguments supporting the decision. Occasional articles
responded to specific criticisms of the decision. For example, Stan Persky defended
the acceptance by the court of oral history, writing that ‘oral history is very much at
the heart of native culture’ (Persky 1998: A19). Other articles defended the Supreme
Court from the charge that it is out of touch with the people. Terry Glavin cited poll-
ing data indicating that a majority of the citizens of British Columbia support the
involvement of the courts in the resolution of aboriginal issues (Glavin 1998: A19).
Several articles, which I will not cite, provided reasonably sophisticated explana-
tions of the role of the courts in liberal constitutional democracies as the protectors
of rights and liberties. And Stephen Hume mounted a detailed defense of 
 
Delga-
muukw
 
 against those ‘who don’t know their own history and don’t much care to
learn it’ and who view the Court’s decision as ‘a frivolous bit of mischief conjured
out of thin air’(Hume 1998a: G4).
Persky and Hume (and the fact that I cite them again indicates the relative scarcity
of favorable views) each presented moral arguments supporting the decision. Persky
addressed the view that holds that current Canadians, especially recent immigrants,
need not take responsibility for past injustices, arguing that ‘moral responsibility
isn’t a matter of individual guilt and/or denial’ (Persky 1998a: A19). He went on to
denounce those who use the idea of equality to attack land claims as hypocritical,
arguing that it is perverse to claim that the rectification of centuries of injustice can
constitute a violation of equality. Hume, for his part, wrote that the decision, far
from being ‘a bizarre invention by mischievous radicals’, is rather ‘the logical
culmination of 200 years of careful and conservative jurisprudence’ and is ‘evidence
of the integrity of our democracy, proof that justice will eventually be done,
however slowly’ (Hume 1998b: G5).
 
The Legislative Debate
 
The decision was discussed in the House of Commons and its various committees.
As a general observation, it is fair to say that the issues raised in Parliament
reflected those in the print media. It is also the case that positions put forward
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 W
es
ter
n O
nta
rio
] a
t 0
7:1
6 0
7 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2 
 Aboriginal Rights Deliberated
 
351
reflected party divisions, with members of the (left-leaning) New Democratic Party
generally in favor of the decision, (right-leaning) Reform Party members opposed,
and government members belonging to the (centrist) Liberal Party taking a
cautious middle ground. In an 11 March 1998 exchange, for example, Gordon
Earle of the New Democratic Party called upon the government to respond to the
decision by negotiating ‘in good faith with aboriginal peoples to resolve issues
around land claims, the sharing of natural resources and self-government’. Stan
Keys, the Liberal parliamentary secretary to the minister of transport, responded
that the government ‘is acting on the principle that the inherent right of self-
government is an existing aboriginal legal right within our constitution’ and that
the government’s approach was to set ‘aside the legal and constitutional debates
that have stymied the process’ (Canada 1998a: 4741). However, much of the
parliamentary debate was driven by the Reform Party’s opposition to the decision,
and by their dislike of the role played by the Supreme Court. Reform Party
member Philip Mayford, for example, noted the court’s reliance on academic liter-
ature: ‘the justices referred not to legal precedents but to the literature from law
schools on which at least their judgment was based in part’(Canada 1998a: 5536).
One member also criticized the court’s position on oral history, saying it will
‘supplement common law with a new system of law in which equal credence is to
be given in aboriginal cases, to the aboriginal perspective’(Canada 1998a: 7496–
7497). Economic uncertainty and the potential cost of the decision were also much
discussed. One member argued that ‘ownership of every square inch of British
Columbia is in doubt’, with the result that ‘industry is saying not one more nickel
of investment until this is settled’ (Canada 1998a: 7411). And the leader of the
Reform Party argued that: 
[the] decision has created economic uncertainty in every sector of the British
Columbia economy that requires land or resources … The decision has created
a potential taxpayer liability of literally tens of billions of dollars. These
impacts are big enough to cripple the British Columbia economy. (Canada
1998a: 7698)
The equality argument against special status for aboriginal people was also
raised, with one member asking: ‘Does the federal government not understand that
the pursuit of separate development is apartheid in Canada?’ (Canada 1998a: 7497).
Equality, on this view, requires identical treatment of all: 
We simply have to treat people on the basis of equality in the country: equal
opportunity for everyone involved … We want aboriginal people to have
the same rights and protections that every Canadian enjoys. (Canada 1999:
905–906)
The argument that special rights arise from the aboriginals’ prior occupancy of the
land was explicitly addressed and rejected: 
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We cannot go back in history 110 or 120 years and try to use that to justify what
is happening today. We have to move forward in a constructive united front for
all Canadians. If we do not, the blood will be on our hands. (Canada 1998a: 7498)
The debate in the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia was greatly influ-
enced by the discussion of the proposed Nisga’a treaty which was happening at the
same time. Much comment, which I will not cite, deals with the possible influence
of the decision on this and other treaty negotiations. There was more discussion
about the potential impacts of the decision and the need to come to terms with
British Columbia’s history of interactions with its First Nations than there was of the
underlying moral rationales for the decision. Gordon Wilson, for example, said the
decision: 
indicates clearly that aboriginal people have rights. These rights run with the
land, and they have rights to their land…it is essential for us to recognize that
there is a legacy of interaction between first nations and non-first nations
people in British Columbia that has left a long and very hurtful past that needs
to be dealt with. (British Columbia 1998/99: 6825)
And B. Goodacre lauded the decision for having clarified government’s responsibil-
ities: ‘We [now] have the basis … to seriously consider what it is that we as a
government are responsible for doing, in terms of negotiations with first nations
(British Columbia 1998/99: 6730–6731). Nevertheless, some thought the decision
lacked clarity. One member stated: 
The problem with 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 is that you have two different readings …
Many first nations see 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 as effectively saying ‘We have ownership
of all the land’. And we are saying: ‘No, rather there is a test that you need to
go through’. (British Columbia 1998/99: 15207).
There was, of course, some opposition to the role played by the court, with one
member saying: ‘The fact that the court decision confirmed … the existence of
aboriginal title does not necessarily make it so’ (British Columbia 1998/99: 6844).
The major concern was the potential impact on the economy. Wilson, speaking of
Northern British Columbia, stated: 
I think it’s important for us to hear and understand the concerns now expressed
by people who live in the north, especially in light of the Supreme Court ruling
in Delgamuukw … No northern jobs commissioner is going to solve the
economic uncertainty until we recognize what that ruling has done. (British
Columbia 1998/99: 8308)
There was, however, very little discussion of the justifications, or lack thereof, for
the decision.
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Implications
 
What lessons for deliberative theory and its possible role in advancing intercultural
understanding can one draw from the debate that followed the court’s decision? As
I outlined above, there are five general lines of argument in favor of special status
for aboriginal people. They are a mixture of factual and normative claims and all
are contestable and contested. The Supreme Court’s rationale, at least as it related
to aboriginal title, was squarely based on one of those arguments, prior occupancy:
‘it is now clear that although aboriginal title was recognized by the proclamation, it
arises from prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples’ (
 
Delgamuukw
 
(S.C.): 1082).
Prior occupancy as a normative principle (or more precisely the view that the time
of arrival of one’s ancestors conveys different rights and privileges) can certainly be
criticized. For example, it conflicts with the principle that all current citizens should
enjoy equal rights. Of course, the conflict of basic normative principles is not
unusual. However, any resolution, in theory or practice, requires that the conflict be
addressed and resolved. Both principles in their pure forms cannot be instantiated at
the same time. That the court did not address this difficulty suggests it fell short of
Rawls’s view of such bodies as ‘exemplars of public reason’. Yet, Habermas’s faith
in wider public debate fared no better. Though the moral merit of prior occupancy of
a territory by one’s ancestors was raised, outside the academic literature I did not
come across any reasoned attempt to reconcile it with the idea that citizens should
enjoy equal rights. In fact, the broader media and legislative debate tended to add to
and amplify the deficiencies of the legal debate.
Proponents of deliberation, such as Habermas, who stress the importance of
generalized public debate want to expand the scope and nature of democracy in
liberal democratic societies. They want citizens, not just legislators and courts, to
take an active role in debating major issues. In furtherance of this goal, they stress
the desirability of an inclusive debate, one in which all can potentially participate,
contribute and have their contributions taken seriously. As I noted at the beginning,
a central benefit claimed for deliberation is that it ‘permits the dissection of a prob-
lem and the devising of better solutions than those reached by negotiation or the
aggregation of preferences, or through a discussion confined to a handful of
initiates’ (Pellizzoni 2001: 60). Because it is impossible to know in advance which
are the better arguments, all arguments should be considered. Unfortunately, most
citizens have neither the time nor the inclination to acquire the requisite knowledge.
Consequently, what one often gets are pure statements of opinion. Even if partici-
pants are disposed to display an openness to the perspectives of cultural minorities,
which is a questionable assumption in itself, this is not sufficient in the absence of
the requisite factual and conceptual base. In the broad public debate sparked by the
Supreme Court’s decision we see little or no indication of any such willingness by
participants to obtain the required knowledge of the facts or of the ways in which the
conflict between different normative principles might be resolved. What, then, is the
basis for the optimistic expectations for democratic deliberation? If the debate were
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about a simple issue and among people sharing a common conceptual base, agree-
ment, or at least reduced disagreement, might be attainable. In circumstances where
the issues are complex and the participants differ as to both facts and values, discus-
sion may simply serve to confirm the participants pre-existing positions.
My description of the 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 debate seems to support the skeptics who
think that in many circumstances discussion exacerbates disagreement rather than
the reverse. It raises questions about whether or not it is realistic to think that delib-
eration can move many members of groups with different interests and cultural
backgrounds toward a common view of the issues. There was no indication that
debate in the media or the legislatures did anything to change peoples’ positions.
Even the reduced level of disagreement in the legal academic community appeared
to arise from a pre-existing shared view rather than the ‘force of the better argu-
ment’. 
 
Delgamuukw
 
 raised issues of both fact and principle. The ‘traditional white’
view of aboriginal societies, their history and their present circumstances simply
does not address the aboriginals’ view of the past and the present. The two views
differ both on the facts, on how the facts should be interpreted, and even on what
constitutes a fact. At the level of principle, the two sides are often, as Pellizzoni says,
‘using the same terms’ – both speak of the importance of equality – but they are
speaking, metaphorically at least, different languages. Participants, in practice,
speak only to, or perhaps more accurately, are only heard by, those who already
think like them. This lack of dialogue is not the result of opposition between aborig-
inal and non-aboriginal. While it should be noted that the public debate was over-
whelmingly dominated by the perspectives of non-aboriginals, there were arguments
sympathetic to the aboriginal position put forward by non-aboriginals. Therefore,
the paucity of deliberation is not an issue of cultural incommensurability: both sides
are capable of understanding each other. From the evidence, the large majority of
non-aboriginals simply do not try to understand the aboriginal perspective.
Inclusiveness is a major consideration for most proponents of deliberation. It is
felt to be important, both to add legitimacy to any eventual decision and, from the
cognitive perspective, to ensure that relevant perspectives and information are taken
into account. Unfortunately, this case suggests that the wider the debate – i.e., the
more it approaches Habermas’s ideal – the less substantive and issue oriented it is.
Within the courts and related legal and academic circles, the debate wrestled with
the issues and put forward reasoned arguments. By contrast, the media and legisla-
tive debates were both largely superficial, with positions put forward as final and
not subject to revision, although the legislative debates did, to some extent at least,
surpass the public in terms of knowledge and openness.
Though deliberation in the courts may have been superior to that of the public at
large, it too had limitations. As I noted, the issues highlighted by the court fell short
of the full range of available public reasons, arguably casting doubt on Rawls’s
identification of public and constitutional reasoning, at least as carried out by the
judiciary. He also seems to have been mistaken in his expectation that a Supreme
Court will act as a role model, setting the terms of the broader public debate in bene-
ficial ways by focusing attention on the principles at stake.
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In the event, the fact that the issue entered the broad public agenda by way of a
court decision had practically the opposite effect. Court cases focus on issues of law
and standing to produce winners and losers. This process tends to discourage
reasoned deliberation of basic principles, in this case of whether or not prior occu-
pancy should give First Nations special status. There was little if any debate in the
public sphere of this issue, even though it was at the heart of the court’s decision.
Rather than discuss the moral merits of the decision, much debate focused on the
role of courts, and whether or not the Supreme Court should ‘impose’ a judicial
solution on what many viewed as a political problem. The court’s position on oral
histories also loomed large in the public debate and served to highlight the polemi-
cal issue of the relative worth of different cultures’ ways of doing things. And, as I
noted above, the fact that the Supreme Court had spoken served as a way for some
to avoid taking potentially unpopular positions in favor of the aboriginal perspec-
tive. The pursuit of a constitutional, legal claim brought the issue to the public
agenda, but that confrontation, so necessary to get on the agenda of the overarching
public sphere, ultimately subverted debate by allowing some to hide behind the
authority of the Supreme Court, and distorted it by focusing attention on issues such
as the admissibility of evidence and the role of the courts which were not central to
the moral and political matter at hand.
The obvious response to the above conclusions is that ‘deliberative democratic
theory is not a predictive social perspective’, but rather ‘a critical yardstick’.
 
7
 
 On
this view, current institutional structures must – to a greater or lesser degree –
undergo structural change if deliberation is to fulfill its potential for more legitimate
and cognitively better outcomes.
 
8
 
 I am unable to address any of the various propos-
als which have been put forward to achieve this improvement. The question which
can be asked by skeptics about the value of public deliberation, and which must
be answered by proponents of the inclusive democratic deliberation advocated
Habermas, is whether it is at all likely, ever, that significant numbers of ordinary
citizens will display the willingness to devote the time and effort informed debate
about complex public matters requires. And is it likely that they will ever do so
when it concerns the demands of cultural minorities, people with different world-
views to their own and interests that conflict with theirs. At present, encouraging
public deliberation of minority demands that potentially impose a cost on the domi-
nant majority does not appear to be a promising tool, either from the minority’s
perspective or that of promoting inter-cultural understanding. Worse, though elite
forums, such as legislatures and especially courts, may perform better, they too fall
short of being exemplary sources of public reasoning idealized by Rawls and can
serve to further weaken, rather than improve, that of the public themselves.
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Notes
1. For the particular problems which arise when debate participants are not racially homogeneous see
Mendelberg and Oleske (2000).
2. McNeil explicated his view in detail in an earlier article (McNeill 1999).
3. Brian Donovan takes a similar position (Donovan 2001).
4. See also Borrows (2001), especially Section II.
5. Some opposing legal perspectives can be found amongst the articles included in Lippert (2000).
6. The writer was quoted making similar points in the Times Colonist, Victoria, 27 December 1997, on
p. 1, and wrote an almost identical letter to The Province, Vancouver, 28 December 1997, on p. A50.
7. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point.
8. For recent proposals which include discussions of the literature see Leib (2004) and Ackerman and
Fishkin (2004).
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